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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
DOWD, District Judge. 
 
I. The Charge and Conviction. 
 
The appellant, Robert Walker, an inmate at The Federal 
Correctional Institute (FCI) in McKean, Pennsylvania, 
prosecutes an appeal from his conviction and sentence of 
18 months for possession of contraband in violation of 18 
U.S.C. S 1791(a)(2). 
 
On October 13, 1995, Walker was undergoing a strip 
search preparatory to being placed in a special holding unit 
within McKean. The two correctional officers conducting the 
search, Scott and Dubois, ordered Walker to remove his 
undershorts at which time Walker removed a ten-inch 
shank. In a subsequent interrogation on November 3, 1995 
by William Turner, an FBI agent, Walker admitted to 
possession of the shank. Walker also admitted that he 
made the weapon, and that he had it for protection because 
of a fellow inmate problem. 
 
II. The Alleged Error of Vouching. 
 
On appeal, Walker's sole error advanced for reversal of 
conviction is the contention that the government prosecutor 
"vouched" for the three government witnesses: Scott, 
Dubois, and Turner. Walker argues that his defense 
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focused on the credibility of the three witnesses and the 
government vouching "undermined fundamental fairness of 
the trial and contributed to a miscarriage of justice." 
 
III. The Setting. 
 
A. The Opening Statements. 
 
The government's opening statement summarized the 
expected testimony of Scott, Dubois and Turner. The 
defendant's opening statement emphasized that the defense 
would be questioning the credibility of the government 
witnesses. 
 
B. A Review of the Testimony of Scott, Dubois, 
   Turner and Zuniga. 
 
Scott testified that he was working in the special housing 
unit1 where Walker was transferred on October 13, 1995, 
and was present when Dubois conducted a visual search of 
Walker in a shower room. Scott indicated that Dubois 
conducted a visual inspection of the shower room before 
the search of Walker. Walker was ordered to remove his 
clothes while Scott held a plastic bag for Walker to put his 
clothes in. After Walker stripped down to his underwear 
and socks, Walker turned his back on Dubois and Scott. 
According to Scott, Dubois then ordered Walker to turn 
around, at which point Walker reached into his waist area 
and turned around with a shank in his right hand. Scott 
told Walker to place the weapon on the grill and step back. 
Scott picked up the weapon and put it in his pocket. He 
then wrote out an incident report and took a photograph of 
the weapon. 
 
Dubois corroborated Scott's testimony. Dubois 
emphasized that when he requested that Walker turn 
around, Walker refused. Then he ordered Walker to turn 
around, but again Walker would not turn around. Dubois 
testified that he finally gave Walker a direct order to turn 
around, at which point Walker turned around with a shank 
in his right hand. Dubois testified that Walker put the 
shank on the grill where Scott grabbed it. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The special housing unit is the area of the institution where prisoners 
who "create problems" out in the general population are placed. 
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FBI Agent Turner described his November 3, 1995 
interview with Walker regarding the incident of October 13, 
1995. He identified Lieutenant Zuniga as also being present 
at the interview. According to Turner, Walker was orally 
advised of his rights and then was given a form to read,2 
which Walker appeared to read and then signed. Turner 
and Zuniga also signed the form as witnesses. 
 
According to Turner, Walker admitted that he had found 
a piece of metal which looked like a key ring outside the 
gymnasium of FCI McKean and straightened it. Walker 
claimed that the end of the ring was already flattened. 
Walker admitted to taking a piece of a sheet and wrapping 
it around the handle. 
 
Lieutenant Zuniga testified that he was present during 
the interview of Walker by Turner on November 3, 1995. 
Zuniga indicated that Turner read Walker his rights and 
the waiver at the bottom of the form and asked Walker if he 
understood them. Turner then gave Walker the form to look 
over and asked him again if he understood his rights. 
Zuniga testified that Walker then signed the waiver. Zuniga 
also stated that he signed the form as a witness. 
 
According to Zuniga, Walker was not threatened into 
signing the form and he appeared fully coherent. Walker 
told Zuniga and Turner that he made the weapon from a 
key ring that he found in the "rec yard." Walker said that 
he straightened the key ring and then sharpened it. Walker 
stated that he made the weapon for protective purposes due 
to a prior altercation with an unidentified inmate. Zuniga 
testified that Walker stated during his interview that he 
used sandpaper to sharpen the point of his weapon. 
 
At no time was there any testimony that suggested an 
alleged bias or ulterior motive on the part of Scott, Dubois, 
Turner, or Zuniga in investigating and reporting this 
incident. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The form contained in written form the same notification of rights that 
had just been given orally, along with a waiver at the bottom. 
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IV. The Alleged Vouching. 
 
After reviewing the testimony and the stipulations, the 
Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) indicated that the 
only contested issue was whether Walker possessed the 
shank. Then the AUSA argued: 
 
        Now, ask yourselves what motivation would Officer 
       Robert Scott and former Officer Raymond Dubois have 
       to come in here and lie to you. What motivation. I 
       submit to you that they have no motivation to lie to 
       you. I submit to you that you can determine, using your 
       common sense and your judgment, you can determine 
       the credibility of those two and the only two 
       eyewitnesses to the search . . . 
 
        Now, in addition, we went further, we then called 
       Agent Turner . . . What motivation would he have to 
       come into this courtroom and lie to you. . . [summary 
       of Turner's testimony] . . . I submit to you that Agent 
       Turner would have no motivation to come into this 
       courtroom and make these things up. I submit to you 
       that Agent Turner corroborated the direct evidence of 
       the two and the only two eyewitnesses. 
 
After final argument advanced on behalf of Walker in 
which Walker's lawyer questioned the Government's proof 
and the credibility of the witnesses by declaring that there 
should have been a video of the search and a recording of 
the alleged confession and imploring the jury to not act as 
a rubber stamp for the Government, the AUSA responded 
in part as follows: 
 
        The testimony was, the testimony of the two officers 
       that have no motivation to lie to you, the testimony 
       was that it came out of the underwear. This was a strip 
       search. They had two officers behind the bars looking 
       and they told you, the eyewitness testimony, that is 
       evidence of this crime. And we submit to you that we 
       have proven that beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . 
 
        And we submit that when you think about the case 
       with your judgment and your wisdom and you take 
       into account that there were only two eyewitnesses and 
       they have told you that they saw the defendant with 
 
 
  
       the object, that, ladies and gentlemen, is proof beyond 
       a reasonable doubt. 
 
V. The Concept of Vouching Discussed in Genera l. 
 
Vouching constitutes an assurance by the prosecuting 
attorney of the credibility of a Government witness through 
personal knowledge or by other information outside of the 
testimony before the jury. United States v. Lawn, 355 U.S. 
339, 359 n. 15, 78 S.Ct. 311, 323 n. 15, 2 L.Ed.2d 321 
(1958). See also United States v. Neceochea, 986 F.2d 1273, 
1276 (9th Cir. 1993). A prosecutor's vouching for the 
credibility of a government witness raises two concerns: (1) 
such comments can convey the impression that evidence 
not presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor, 
supports the charges against the defendant and can thus 
jeopardize the defendant's right to be tried solely on the 
basis of the evidence presented to the jury; and (2) the 
prosecutor's opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the 
Government and may induce the jury to trust the 
Government's judgment rather than its own view of the 
evidence. Young, 470 U.S. at 18, 105 S.Ct. at 1048; United 
States v. Molina-Guevara, 96 F.3d 698, 704 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
While it was formerly the rule in this Circuit that 
vouching for a witness based on information not in the 
record required reversal per se, United States v. DiLoreto, 
888 F.2d 996, 999 (3d Cir. 1989), such comments now 
must be analyzed on a case by case basis. United States v. 
Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1267 (3d Cir. 1995). 3 This Circuit 
has analyzed vouching in a number of cases, and a review 
of the case law will be helpful to put this case in context. 
 
VI. A Review of the Case Law. 
 
In United States v. Gallagher, 576 F.2d 1028, 1040-43 
(3d Cir. 1978), the prosecutor told the jury during opening 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d at 1267, expressly overruled DiLoreto. This Circuit, 
sitting en banc, held that the per se  reversal rule of DiLoreto 
conflicted 
with the case by case analysis of prosecutorial misconduct required by 
the Supreme Court in Young, 470 U.S. at 11-12, 105 S.Ct. at 1044- 
1045. 
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statement that the Government's testimony would come 
from the mouths of "truthful, credible" witnesses, and that 
all one witness "could testify to is the truth." Id. at 1041. 
This Court held that improper vouching had occurred, but 
did not grant the defendant a new trial. We explained that 
"in view of the amplitude of the evidence proving the 
appellant's guilt, we cannot say that the unfortunate 
statements quoted above alone require reversal." 
 
In United States v. Swinehart, 617 F.2d 336, 338-340 (3d 
Cir. 1980), the prosecutor in closing argument stated that 
the Government's expert witness "is an honest witness." Id. 
at 339 n. 3. He also stated that this witness "of all 
witnesses and I believe that all the witnesses that testified 
[sic], testified honestly was one of the most honest." Id. The 
prosecutor went on, "I suggest that the expert in this case 
who testified concerning the questioned documents, that 
his testimony is totally worthy of belief." Id. We once again 
expressed our disapproval at these comments and held that 
they constituted improper vouching by the Government's 
attorney. Id. However, we held that the improper comment 
did not warrant reversal because the jury would have 
convicted the defendant even had it not been exposed to the 
improper prosecutorial comments. Id. 
 
In United States v. Beaty, 722 F.2d 1090, 1097 (3d Cir. 
1983), the prosecutor stated during summation that the 
witnesses who had appeared pursuant to a plea-bargain 
"promised to tell the truth and they were telling the truth 
before the judge who will sentence them in this matter. . . ." 
The court held that this comment constituted vouching. Id. 
However, the court held that this comment was not 
prejudicial. We explained, "[t]he prosecution witnesses' 
credibility was a hotly contested issue throughout the trial. 
The jury was, therefore, more likely to view this statement 
as an argument than as a revelation." Id. We also noted 
that there was overwhelming evidence of guilt, and that the 
judge's instructions dispelled any improper inferences that 
the jurors may have drawn. Id. 
 
In DiLoreto, 888 F.2d at 998-1000, the prosecutor stated 
during rebuttal in reference to a witness that was appearing 
pursuant to a plea bargain that, "[I]f they lie, that bargain 
is off . . . We don't take liars. We don't put liars on the 
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stand. We don't do that." Id. at 999. We construed this 
statement by the prosecutor as an assertion to the jury that 
the government does not use liars as witnesses in its cases. 
Id. In this light, we held that the comment made by the 
prosecutor during rebuttal was improper vouching. Id. at 
1000. Since we had not yet adopted a case-by-case analysis 
for comments based on evidence not in the record, we did 
not inquire into whether the above quoted statement was 
prejudicial. We instead held that it was reversible error per 
se. Id. 
 
In United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1120-1127 
(3d Cir. 1990), the prosecutor made several remarks during 
rebuttal argument that the defendant challenged as  
vouching.4 The success of the government's case hinged on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The prosecutor made the following comment about the FBI agents and 
state law officers who testified at trial: 
 
       the FBI agents and state troopers in this case are not criminals. 
       There's no evidence to indicate that those good men suborned 
       perjury or made up anything and that's why the Government 
       brought them in[,] so that you could judge their credibility from 
the 
       witness stand. Id. at 1123. 
 
The prosecutor further urged the jury to consider the oaths of office 
taken by the law enforcement officers: 
 
       You decide if it was [the defense witness] that was telling the 
truth 
       or if it was all those FBI agents and state troopers who swore an 
       oath who many of them told you have been agents and troopers for 
       19 years, 18 years, 17 years, you decide if they put their jobs, 
their 
       careers and everything they worked for all those years on the line 
to 
       fabricate testimony and put words in a witnesses mouth. Id. at 1123 
       n.56. 
 
Lastly, the prosecutor attested to the integrity of the prosecutorial 
team and commented upon the testimony of two of the Government's 
witnesses: 
 
        We're [the prosecutorial team] and make no mistake about it. 
       What he's telling you, what a lot of these defense attorneys are 
       telling you is that we fed this information to those Defendants, 
and 
       you know what? You've heard us throughout the course of this trial. 
       I'm not a genius but I'm not that dumb that I casually mentioned 
       things to them without knowing exactly what I'm doing. I'm not that 
       stupid . . . Those FBI agents, those state troopers, those 
policemen, 
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the credibility of the two government witnesses. Id. at 1120. 
The defense strategy was to attack the credibility of these 
witnesses. Id. The defense counsel had suggested that 
federal and state law enforcement officers had fabricated 
the government witnesses' testimony. Id. at 1121. The 
defense counsel made accusatory remarks during opening 
statement, vigorously cross-examined the government 
witnesses, and made the integrity of the government 
personnel the central theme of their closing arguments. Id. 
at 1121-1122. 
 
We held that the statement by the prosecutor that,"the 
only way they got their stories together is if law 
enforcement told them each what to say[,] and there is 
nothing to indicate that happened, and it didn't happen," 
was not vouching. Id. at 1124. We explained that the 
statement did not suggest that the prosecutor had access to 
undisclosed facts that would support the credibility of the 
government witnesses. Id. "Instead, faced with 
contradictory testimony regarding the preparation of its 
witnesses, the prosecutor urged the jury to accept the 
testimony most favorable to the government. This, in itself, 
was proper argument." Id. at 1125. 
 
We also held that the prosecutor's comment that the FBI 
agents were brought in to testify because they were not 
criminals was not vouching. Id. at 1125 n. 57. We noted 
that, in context, the comment merely points to the lack of 
any compelling evidence that the officers had engaged in 
any misconduct. Id. We observed that "[o]ur precedents do 
not constrain a prosecutor from pointing to an absence of 
evidence which might reflect negatively on his witnesses, so 
long as he does not suggest the existence of undisclosed 
facts which would support a favorable credibility 
determination." Id. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       they're not real stupid either. The only way that[the government 
       witnesses] testimony could be consistent in this case is one of two 
       ways. They're either telling the truth or . . . the only way that 
they 
       got their stories together is if law enforcement told them each 
what 
       to say[,] and there is nothing to indicate that that happened, and 
it 
       didn't happen. Id. at 1123. 
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Lastly, we held that the comment by the prosecutor 
concerning the credibility of testifying law enforcement 
personnel and the prosecutorial team was vouching 
because it invoked facts outside the record to assure the 
jury that they would not lie because lying would jeopardize 
their careers. Id. "We observe that there was no evidence 
backing the prosecutor's comments that the U.S. Attorneys 
and law enforcement officers could not have behaved as 
unscrupulously as defense counsel alleged they did without 
violating their oaths of office and jeopardizing their 
careers." Id. However, we held that this vouching did not 
require reversal because it fell squarely within the invited 
response doctrine.5 
 
More recently, in United States v. Bethancourt, 65 F.3d 
1074, 1079-1080 (3d Cir. 1995), the defendant challenged 
the integrity of the Drug Enforcement Agents who testified 
at trial.6 The prosecutor responded that the defendant's 
argument was improbable and that the witness did not lie.7 
On appeal, the Government conceded that the prosecutor's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The invited response doctrine "teaches that where a prosecutorial 
argument has been made in reasonable response to improper attacks by 
defense counsel, the unfair prejudice flowing from the two arguments 
may balance each other out, thus obviating the need for a new trial." Id. 
at 1126. The prosecutor may not use the improper remarks of the 
defense counsel as a springboard for the launching of affirmative attacks 
upon the defendants. Id. The doctrine's reach extends only to defensive, 
as opposed to offensive, argument by the prosecutor. Id. at 1127. 
 
6. The defense counsel "also argued that the government agents typed up 
the confession and `they put stuff in there that[the defendant] was never 
gonna agree to;' and that faking his signature to the confession `tells 
you 
[the jury] that in no way are they the statements, are they the words, are 
they the concepts, or is that the confession of [the defendant]. It's 
theirs 
and they tried to make it his.' " Id. at 1079. 
 
7. The prosecutor stated: 
 
        For what, ladies and gentleman? He's gonna risk his career? He's 
       gonna risk his job? He's gonna risk going to jail? For what? To lie 
       to you on the stand, ladies and gentleman? I submit not, ladies and 
       gentleman . . . [the prosecution's witnesses] don't make up lies. 
And 
       they didn't lie here and they're not lying to you, ladies and 
       gentlemen, when they tell you what they did. And they're not lying 
       to you when they tell you that defendant . . . talked to them about 
       the statement. Id. at 1079. 
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remarks were "ill-advised". Id. We held that these 
statements did not amount to plain error. Id. at 1080. We 
noted that: (1) the comments in rebuttal were isolated and 
followed an untainted closing; (2) the district court gave 
clear instructions to the jury; and (3) the evidence produced 
at trial against the defendant was overwhelming. 
 
Most recently, in Molina-Guevara, 96 F.3d 698, 703-705 
(3d Cir. 1996), the prosecutor during rebuttal represented 
that an uncalled witness would have corroborated the 
testimony of the United States Customs Service Agent who 
testified at trial and whose credibility was at issue. Id. at 
703. The prosecutor further told the jury that it was 
"insulting" and "ridiculous" to think that the Government 
would put a witness on the stand who would lie. Id. at 704. 
The prosecutor also assured the jury that the agent in 
question "did not lie to you." Id. We held that these 
statements were vouching and impermissible. Id. at 705. 
Since the defendant made the appropriate objections and 
moved for mistrial, we applied a harmless error analysis. Id. 
at 703. We held that because the prosecutor's rebuttal 
referenced a potential witness who never took the stand, 
the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights under the 
Confrontation Clause were violated. Id. at 705. Accordingly, 
we reversed the conviction because we could not say that 
the improper comments were harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
 
Our case law indicates that to find vouching two criteria 
must be met: (1) the prosecutor must assure the jury that 
the testimony of a Government witness is credible; and (2) 
this assurance is based on either the prosecutor's personal 
knowledge, or other information not contained in the 
record. Thus, it is not enough for a defendant on appeal to 
assert that the prosecutor assured the jury that a witness' 
testimony was credible. The defendant must be able to 
identify as the basis for that comment an explicit or implicit 
reference to either the personal knowledge of the 
prosecuting attorney or information not contained in the 
record. See Lawn, 355 U.S. at 339 n. 15, 78 S.Ct. at 323 
n.15. It follows that where a prosecutor argues that a 
witness is being truthful based on the testimony given at 
trial, and does not assure the jury that the credibility of the 
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witness based on his own personal knowledge, the 
prosecutor is engaging in proper argument and is not 
vouching. See Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1125. Likewise, 
prosecutorial comment that points to a lack of evidence in 
the record which supports a defendant's argument that the 
witness is not credible is proper so long as the comment 
does not constitute an assurance by the prosecutor that the 
witness is credible. See Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1125 n. 57. 
 
A prosecutor may argue in the negative that the 
assertions made by defense counsel that a witness is lying 
are not supported by the testimony in the record. What the 
prosecutor may not do is take the next step. Once the 
defense counsel's argument is rebutted, the prosecutor's 
references to the witness' credibility should end. If the 
prosecutor proceeds further and starts arguing in the 
affirmative that the witness is credible, and does so based 
on either information that is not in the record or his/her 
own personal knowledge, then the prosecutor has engaged 
in vouching. 
 
VII. A Plain Error Analysis of the Alleged Vou ching. 
 
Walker did not object to the alleged vouching during trial. 
Therefore, we review the record for plain error. Bethancourt, 
65 F.3d at 1079. "In order to be plain error, an error must 
not only be `obvious,' it must also `have affected the 
outcome of the District Court proceeding.' " Id. (citing 
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 
1778-79, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). "We may reverse only if 
we find error in the prosecutor's comments so serious as to 
`undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial and 
contribute to a miscarriage of justice.' " Pungitore, 910 F.2d 
at 1126.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Walker argues that the plain error analysis is not significantly 
different than the harmless error analysis. This is simply not true. In 
Olano, 507 U.S. at 734-35, the Supreme Court compared the harmless 
error standard to the plain error standard and noted, "[w]hile [harmless 
error analysis] precludes error correction only if the error `does not 
affect 
substantial rights', [plain error review] authorizes no remedy unless the 
error does `affec[t] substantial rights.' " Furthermore, the Court noted 
that, under plain error review, reversal is permitted but not mandatory. 
Id. at 735. Thus, a plain error that affects substantial rights, without 
more, does not mandate reversal, "for otherwise the discretion afforded 
by [the plain error standard] would be illusory." Id. at 737. 
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Walker contends that the AUSA improperly vouched for 
Scott and Dubois when she stated: 
 
       Now ask yourselves what motivation would officer 
       Robert Scott and former Officer Raymond Dubois have 
       to come in here and lie to you. What motivation. I 
       submit to you that they have no motivation to lie to 
       you. I submit to you that you can determine, using your 
       common sense and your judgment, you can determine 
       the credibility of those two and the only two 
       eyewitnesses to the search. 
 
The comment by the AUSA consists first of the rhetorical 
question, "What motivation [would these witnesses have to 
lie]?" This question is not vouching. It does not maintain 
the credibility of the two witnesses by referring to 
information outside the record, nor does it contain a 
personal assurance of veracity. Viewed in context, the 
statement merely points to the fact that Walker did not 
produce any evidence indicating a motive on the part of the 
law enforcement officers to lie. As we have previously 
stated, it is permissible for a prosecutor to point to an 
absence of evidence that might reflect negatively on her 
witness, so long as she does not suggest the existence of 
undisclosed facts that would support a favorable credibility 
determination. Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1125 n. 57.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Gallagher, 576 F.2d at 1041, is not to the contrary. Walker contends 
that language identical to the rhetorical question analyzed here was held 
to be vouching by the Gallagher court. In Gallagher, the prosecuting 
attorney during opening statement asked, "What motive did [the 
government witness] have to lie against [one of the defendants]? There is 
none, because she was telling the truth." Id. We held that statement to 
constitute vouching in its entirety. However, it should be clear from the 
discussion supra, that it is the second sentence in the quotation and not 
the first one that offends the rule against vouching. The statement, 
"[t]here is none, because she was telling the truth," is vouching because 
it assured the jury that the witness was credible, implicitly based on the 
attorney's own personal knowledge. In other words, the prosecutor was 
personally assuring the credibility of the witness. The rhetorical 
question 
posed in the first sentence did not personally assure the credibility of 
the 
witness, nor did it maintain the credibility of the witness based on 
information not contained in the record. Therefore, the rhetorical 
question was not, in and of itself, vouching. 
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The second part of the AUSA's remark during closing 
consists of the statement, "I submit to you that they have 
no motivation to lie to you. I submit to you that you can 
determine, using you common sense and your judgment, 
you can determine the credibility of those two [witnesses]. 
. . ." The phrase "I submit to you that," without more, does 
not constitute vouching. Submit means "[t]o commit to the 
discretion of another," or "[t]o yield to the will of another," 
or "to present for determination; as an advocate submits a 
proposition for the approval of the court." BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1278 (5th ed. 1979). Thus, the phrase"I 
submit to you that," is merely a method of prefacing an 
argument and does not by itself constitute vouching. The 
phrase fails to meet the vouching standard because it does 
not assure the jury that the witness is credible, but instead 
asks the jury to find that the witness was credible. This is 
proper argument. 
 
This reading of the phrase is supported by its context. 
The AUSA asked the jury to find that the witness was 
credible "using your common sense and your judgment. 
. . ." Clearly, the prosecutor is merely asking the jury to 
view the evidence in a light most favorable to her case, 
which is proper argument. See Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1125. 
 
Walker also challenges the following comment made 
during closing argument by the AUSA regarding the 
testimony of Turner, "What motivation would he have to 
come into this courtroom and lie to you . . . I submit to you 
that Agent Turner would have no motivation to come into 
this courtroom and make these things up." This comment 
is similar to the one analyzed above and is not vouching for 
the same reasons. The rhetorical question merely points to 
a lack of evidence produced by Walker in support of his 
claim that the government witnesses were lying. It is clear 
from the surrounding context that the second sentence 
merely asked the jury to accept the testimony in a light 
most favorable to the government. Thus, it is not vouching, 
but proper argument. Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1125. 
 
This is not to say, however, that prosecutors have free 
license to say whatever they please as long as they preface 
their remarks with the phrase, "I submit to you that." This 
phrase is not a magic talisman that wards off allegations of 
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vouching. Moreover, it is poor practice for federal 
prosecutors to frequently use rhetorical statements 
punctuated with excessive use of the personal pronoun "I". 
Such a practice runs the risk that the words that follow will 
convey the personal view of the prosecutor to the jurors. 
See United States v. Eltayib, 88 F.3d 157, 172-73 (2d Cir. 
1996); United States v. Rivera, 22 F.3d 430, 437-38 (2d Cir. 
1994). We endorse the alternative suggestions of our sister 
circuit in United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1328 
(2d Cir. 1987), where the court directs: 
 
        It is perfectly acceptable practice for a prosecutor to 
       use language in addressing the jury such as "you are 
       free to conclude," "you may perceive that," "it is 
       submitted that," or "a conclusion on your part may be 
       drawn," to mention only a few examples of 
       unobjectionable phraseology. It is obligatory for 
       prosecutors to find careful ways of inviting jurors to 
       consider drawing argued inferences and conclusions 
       and yet to avoid giving the impression that they are 
       conveying their personal views to the jurors. 
 
Finding no error, the judgment of the district court will 
be AFFIRMED. 
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